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Abstract: We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided
asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the stan-
dard prediction of the lemons market model–if any, only low-type
firms are traded–is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the
difference between pre- and post-merger profits, are not necessarily
higher for low-type firms. This has two implications. First, under
very general conditions, equilibria exist where mergers take place, and
there is no presumption that there is inefficiently low trade. Second,
in these equilibria it is typically not the case that only low-type firms
enter an agreement.
Keywords: merger, asymmetric information, oligopoly, single cross-
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1 Introduction
Since the nineteen sixties, there have been several extended periods of large
scale merger activity. Nevertheless, some authors (e.g. Ravenscraft and
Scherer 1987, 1989; Healy et al. 1992; Scherer 2002) have questioned the
overall profitability of mergers. Also, numerous case studies suggest that at
least one of the parties involved in a merger is likely to consider the deal a
failure with the benefit of hindsight. For example, in the merger with the
German Hypobank, the Hypovereinsbank discovered “the full horror of its
partner’s balance sheet” after two years (The Economist, July 29, 2000).
Thus, even though asymmetric information looms large in the market for
firms, it seems hard to detect inefficiently low trade levels, let alone market
breakdown, as suggested by the lemons market rationale emanating from
Akerlof (1970). Is it therefore misleading to think of the merger market as a
market for lemons?
In the following, we want to argue that the lemons market model is indeed
not the ideal way to think of mergers, in spite of the considerable uncertainty
surrounding them. Even though anecdotes on failed mergers and takeovers
typically single out one of the partners as the lemon, the asymmetric infor-
mation surrounding mergers is usually two-sided: Each of the firms knows
more about its quality than the potential partner does. Both parties thus
face the risk of joining a bad partner who adversely affects the profits of the
merged entity. In the present paper, we therefore consider mergers under
two-sided asymmetric information about firms’ types.1 High types are de-
fined as having high stand-alone profits–that is, high profits in the absence
of a merger–and as contributing to high merger profits if the transaction
occurs.
1Hviid and Prendergast (1993) provide an analysis of merger games with one-sided
asymmetric information. Assuming that the target firm has private information about
its profitability, they show that an unsuccessful bid may increase the profitability of the
target but reduce the profitability of the bidding firm (relative to the profitability before
the merger offer) due to learning from rejection.
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Even with two-sided asymmetric information, it may seem natural to
expect that low types are more likely to become involved in a merger, as they
expect low stand-alone profits and therefore have little to lose from giving up
their identity. However, this is only one aspect of a firm’s merger decision.
To understand whether low types are really more willing to enter a merger
agreement, it is necessary to consider the relation between a firm’s type
and its merger returns, that is, the difference between post-merger profits
and stand-alone profits, where the latter can be interpreted as the firm’s
opportunity costs of the merger. As it turns out, it is not clear that low-type
firms face higher merger returns than high-type firms.
To see this, consider a cash-financed transaction where the seller receives
a fixed cash-payment if the merger takes place. Then, the seller’s merger re-
turns are the (type-independent) cash-payment minus the stand-alone profits.
Thus, the seller’s merger returns are decreasing in own type because stand-
alone profits are increasing own type. For the buyer, however, the situation is
less clear: His merger returns are the post-merger profits of the new firm mi-
nus stand-alone profits minus the cash payment. It is natural to assume that
the post-merger profits are increasing in the buyer’s type: A better buyer
will, in general, increase the performance of the new firm. If this latter effect
is strong enough, it will dominate over the stand-alone profit effect (which
tends to drive good buyers out of merger deals).
Which of the two effects dominates depends critically on the technology of
the merged firm. To illustrate this, we analyze the firms’ merger returns in a
linear Cournot framework.2 First, consider the case where the buyer imposes
its technology on the firm that has been taken over, so that the merged entity
produces with the buyer’s marginal costs (buyer-dominated mergers). In this
case, the marginal effect of a higher type on stand-alone profits is always lower
2In spite of the well-known result that, in such a setting, two-firm mergers do not
increase joint profits unless they lead to monopoly (Salant et al. 1983), Barros (1998)
has shown that joint profits may rise due to rationalization effects when there is cost-
heterogeneity between the firms. In principle, therefore, there is scope for efficiency-
enhancing mergers.
2
than the marginal effect on post-merger profits, so that the buyer’s merger
returns are increasing in own type.3 Second, consider the case where the
new entity produces with the marginal costs of the more efficient firm, no
matter whether this is the buyer or the seller (rationalization mergers). In
this case, the buyer’s merger returns are monotone increasing (decreasing)
in own type if the buyer (the seller, respectively) is more efficient. Thus, for
rationalization mergers, it is also not generally true that low-type firms have
more to gain from a merger. Finally, consider the case where the seller has
a strong impact on the new firm’s technology (seller-dominated mergers),
i.e. the new firm produces either with the seller’s technology or with a biased
average of the buyer’s and seller’s marginal costs. Only in this case will the
buyer’s merger returns be monotone decreasing in own type, so that standard
adverse selection results translate directly to the merger setting.
With these findings in place, we proceed to the analysis of a more general
reduced-formmerger game in which two firms are matched whose types zi, i =
1, 2, are drawn from distributions that are common knowledge.4 After having
observed their own type, both firms state whether they consent to a merger.
If both firms consent, a merger takes place. If at least one firm declines,
there is no merger. Following the merger game, an oligopoly game is played.
If no merger occurs, both firms earn their stand-alone profits. If a merger
occurs, the joint profit is shared according to some predetermined rule. In the
simplest case, one firm buys the other one at a constant price p, as sketched
in the Cournot example.5 However, our results are also consistent with other
ways of profit sharing.
Our main results are the following. First, if merger returns are monotone
decreasing in own type for both firms, the standard results from the adverse
3The seller’s merger returns are decreasing in own type, as in all other cases considered
below.
4In specific applications, types may be interpreted as cost or demand parameters, with
lower cost or higher demand corresponding to a better type.
5As will become clear in Section 4, much of our analysis goes through for more complex
mechanisms.
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selection literature carry over: In the two-sided lemons equilibrium, no trade
is often the only equilibrium and, if trade takes place, only low-type firms
consent to the merger. Second, if only the seller’s returns are decreasing
in own type, whereas the buyer’s returns are increasing, the merger pattern
looks dramatically different: Equilibria with trade exist quite generally, and
in these lemons and peaches equilibria, low-type sellers merge with high-type
buyers. Further, there will typically be non-degenerate type sets for which
buyers regret the merger ex post, and non-degenerate type sets for which
sellers regret the merger ex post. The last statement is true even if the seller
receives a reimbursement that is independent of the competitor’s type: As
the buyer turns out to be worse than expected, sellers realize they could have
made stand-alone profits that exceed the takeover price. Finally, independent
of the properties of merger returns, there is always a no-merger equilibrium
where firms merge with probability zero: If both firms believe that the other
firm will not consent to the merger, irrespective of its type, it is a (weakly)
best response not to consent, and beliefs are correct in equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce the analytical framework. Section 3 analyzes the monotonicity
properties of the merger return functions in the linear Cournot model with
cash payment. Section 4 analyzes the Bayesian equilibria for various assump-
tions on merger return functions that are consistent with the examples from
the Cournot case. Section 5 concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
We consider an oligopoly with an exogenous number of firms n ≥ 2. Two
of these firms, denoted as i = 1, 2, are matched to play a merger game.
Each firm is characterized by a type zi ∈ R, which influences its profitability.
There is asymmetric information about the value of zi, i.e. firms know their
own zi, but not their competitor’s zj, j 6= i. The ex ante probability of zi
is described by a probability distribution Fi with density fi and compact
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support [zi, zi] ⊂ R. Fi is common knowledge. Note that we allow for ex
ante heterogeneity between firms, i.e. firms’ types zi may be drawn from
different distributions.6
Firms simultaneously announce whether they are willing to merge. The
decision of firm i is summarized in a variable si such that si = 1 if it consents
to an agreement and si = 0 if it rejects it. A merger occurs if and only if
si = 1 for i = 1, 2. If no merger occurs, each firm earns its stand-alone
oligopoly profit πi (zi, zj). If a merger occurs, the merged entity earns total
profit πM (zi, zj) .These functions are defined on some setZ = Z1×Z2, where
[zi, zi] ⊆ Zi. The properties of πi and πM reflect more primitive assumptions
on the nature of product market interaction and the interpretation of the type
variable. Throughout the paper, we shall require the following assumption
on the firms’ stand-alone profits to be satisfied.
Assumption 1 πi is non-decreasing in zi; πM is non-decreasing in z1 and
z2.
Thus, by definition, higher types are more efficient: The higher a firm’s
type, the higher its stand-alone profits and the higher the profit of the merged
entity that it becomes a part of. The next assumption relates the other firm’s
type to own stand-alone profits.
Assumption 2 ∂πi/∂zj ≤ ∂πMi /∂zj for i = 1, 2, j 6= i.7
This assumption is particularly appealing for horizontal mergers: There,
stand-alone profits typically fall if the competitor becomes more efficient.
Thus, the left-hand side of the inequality is negative. In addition, because
6This is of particular importance for vertical or conglomerate mergers where firms pro-
duce entirely different goods. Even the interpretation of the firms’ types might differ: For
vertical mergers, for instance, the types might correspond to the costs of input production
for the upstream firm and marketing ability for the downstream firm.
7We are implicitly assuming that the profit functions are differentiable here for nota-
tional convenience only.
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of Assumption 1, total post-merger profits increase if firm j becomes better.
If the owners of both firms (weakly) benefit from these higher profits, then
πMi is non-decreasing in zj and the right-hand side of the inequality is non-
negative.8
Denoting the individual post-merger profits of the formerly separate firms
by πMi (zi, zj), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, we further require a balanced budget for the
merger transaction.
Assumption 3 The merging firms’ individual profits add up to the joint
profits of the merged firm, i.e. πM1 (z1, z2) + πM2 (z2, z1) = πM (z1, z2) .
We do not make any general assumptions on how exactly the functions
πMi are determined, that is, how profits are split in case a of a merger.
Nevertheless, even though much of our general analysis in Section 4 makes
sense for alternative sharing rules, it will often be useful to think of a specific
example where the owners of one firm, say firm 1, compensate the owners
of the other firm, firm 2, by a cash payment p > 0 for the takeover, so that
πM1 (z1, z2) = πM (z1, z2)−p and πM2 (z2, z1) = p. In fact, in Section 3, we will
provide a linear Cournot example with cash compensation to illustrate the
crucial relation between a firm’s type and its merger returns.9
At first glance, the two-sidedness of asymmetric information no longer
seems to be relevant with cash compensation: After all, only the buyer’s post-
merger payoff depends on the other player’s type. However, the opportunity
costs of a merger do depend on the other firm’s type for both sellers and
buyers: In a horizontal setting, the stand-alone profit is lower the better the
other firm is. Therefore, merging with a high type is more attractive because
the outside option is worse.
8In vertical relationships, however, both upstream and downstream firms usually have
higher profits when the other party is of a high type. Therefore, the left-hand side might
be positive and the relation does not necessarily hold.
9Later on in the paper, we will also refer to another specific example where firms
commit to a particular split of joint profits ex ante, even if one firm turns out to be very
inefficient ex post. This is essentially the way profits are shared if the owners of a merging
firm are compensated by shares in the new firm.
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3 The Merger Return Function
The last section suggested that merger decisions are closely related to merger
returns, i.e. the difference between post- and pre-merger profits. We therefore
introduce the following definition:
Definition 1 (i) Firm i’s individual merger returns are given by
gi (zi, zj) ≡ πMi (zi, zj)− πi (zi, zj) .
(ii) The merging firms’ joint merger returns are given by
g (z1, z2) ≡ πM (z1, z2)− π1 (z1, z2)− π2 (z1, z2) .
These merger return functions reflect the nature of product market com-
petition both before and after the merger, as well as the effect of the merger
on the technology adopted by the new firm. Individual return functions also
depend on the way in which profits are split. If Assumption 2 holds, indi-
vidual merger returns for firm i are always non-decreasing in zj, j 6= i. We
shall now explore the monotonicity properties of gi with respect to zi. For
definiteness, we shall think of merger transactions as being cash-financed
in this section, which is not necessary for our general considerations in the
remainder of the paper.
We shall analyze the properties of the merger return functions in a simple
Cournot setting. Suppose that, initially, there are n firms with marginal costs
ci, i = 1, ..., n, and inverse demand is given by P (Q) = a − Q, where Q =Pn
i qi is aggregate output and a > 0. We consider a merger game between
firm 1 and 2. Let the firms’ types be defined as zi ≡ −ci, i.e. the negative
of marginal costs. Suppose that z1 and z2 are uniformly and independently
distributed with compact support Z = Z1 = Z2 = [z, z].
For simplicity, we assume that the marginal costs of the firms j 6= 1, 2
not involved in the merger are known to equal 1, so that
P
j 6=1,2 cj = n− 2.
We focus on situations where all firms produce positive equilibrium outputs
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both before and after the merger. We denote the type of the merged entity
by zM = −cM , where cM is the marginal cost of the new firm. Finally, we
shall assume that zM is a function zM (zi, zj). Under these assumptions, firm
i’s stand-alone profits are given by
πi (zi, zj) =
(a+ nzi − zj + (n− 2))2
(n+ 1)2
,
whereas the new firm’s post-merger profits are
πM (zi, zj) =
(a+ (n− 1) zM (zi, zj) + (n− 2))2
n2 .
We use these formulae below to determine merger returns under different
assumptions on zM (zi, zj), that is, on how the technology adopted by the
merged firm depends on the pre-merger technologies. Figure 1 illustrates the
model for n = 3. The triangle ABC delineates the admissible set of those
(c1, c2) for which all firms produce positive outputs.
<Figure 1 around here>
We now proceed to show that merger returns are not necessarily de-
creasing in own type–so that simple analogies from Akerlof’s (1970) lemons
model are inadequate to characterize the potential equilibria of the merger
game. The monotonicity properties of the merger return functions depend
crucially on the merger technology zM (zi, zj) that we have not specified so
far. The most common assumption in the merger literature is that the new
firm works with the technology zM = max(z1, z2) of the more efficient part,
implying that the merger gives rise to rationalization effects. This makes
sense if the technology of the superior firm can easily be implemented in the
new firm and if, in addition, there are no synergies.10
10Even if one firm has higher marginal costs than the other one, it may be more efficient
in some dimensions. Then, the new entity might benefit from adapting some aspects of the
relatively bad firm’s technology and the type might increase to some zM > max(z1, z2).
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There are, of course, very different ways to think of the effects of mergers
on marginal costs. Suppose, for instance, that marginal costs depend mainly
on the average productivity of a firm’s employees. Then, the marginal costs
of the merged firm should be some weighted average of the constituent parts,
so that
zM = βz1 + (1− β)z2, β ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
Another possibility could arise when the productivity of a firm is mainly
the result of tacit knowledge of its managers that is hard to communicate. In
this case, it is not clear whether this knowledge will find its way into the new
firm. For instance, when firm 1 buys firm 2 at some given price, there may be
no incentive for the managers of firm 2 to inform the new firm’s management
about useful business knowledge they might have. The new firm might then
have to use the buyer’s technology, i.e. zM = z1. We refer to this as the
case of a buyer-dominated merger. Obviously, this is a special case of (1),
with β = 1. The other extreme in (1), β = 0, is harder to justify. There is
no obvious reason why the seller’s technology should be applied in the new
firm, unless it is more efficient than the buyer’s technology. But applying
the seller’s technology only when it is more efficient would correspond to a
rationalization merger. Nevertheless, we shall deal with the seller-dominated
merger below as a benchmark case, in addition to buyer-dominated mergers
and rationalization mergers.
3.1 Case 1: Buyer-Dominated Mergers
First, consider the case where the new firm produces with the buyer’s tech-
nology (β = 1), so that zM = z1 (buyer-dominated mergers). Then the
buyer’s merger returns are given by
g1 (z1, z2) ≡ πM (z1, z2)− π1 (z1, z2)− p (2)
=
(a+ (n− 1) z1 + (n− 2))2
n2 −




whereas the seller’s merger returns are
g2 (z1, z2) ≡ p− π2 (z2, z1) (3)




Clearly, Assumption 2 holds, so that ∂gi/∂zj > 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, because
higher competitor types negatively affect own stand-alone profits but leave
post-merger profits unaffected.11 Also, for the seller, merger returns are
decreasing in own type z2: High-type sellers earn high stand-alone profits,
whereas the takeover price is independent of types. For the buyer, however,
merger returns are increasing in own type z1: Not only do high-type buyers
earn higher stand-alone profits, they also earn higher profits in the merged
entity. Straightforward calculations show that the latter effect dominates
over the former: Intuitively, the reduced intensity of competition after the
merger (due to the elimination of one firm) means that the merged firm’s
output is higher than the buyer’s stand-alone output. Thus, lower marginal
costs have a stronger effect on profits after the merger. As a result, high-type
buyers have more to gain from mergers than low-type buyers. By continuity,
this result also holds for β sufficiently close to 1: The impact of the buyer
on the post-merger technology is then sufficiently strong to guarantee that
lower marginal costs have a stronger effect on post-merger profits than on
stand-alone profits.
Before proceeding, we note that, for buyer-dominated mergers, the set of
types for which the merger is efficient under certainty (i.e. where joint merger
returns are positive), is bounded by ABE in Figure 1. Only if the buyer has
a substantial efficiency advantage over the seller, can a buyer-dominated
merger be efficient. For firms that are relatively homogeneous, the standard
argument of Salant et al. (1983) shows that mergers are inefficient.
11The post-merger profit of the buyer, πM , is a function of z1 alone by definition, whereas
the post-merger profit of the seller is simply p.
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3.2 Case 2: Seller-Dominated Mergers
Next, consider the case where the new firm produces with the technology
of the seller (β = 0), so that zM = z2 (seller-dominated mergers). As noted
above, we do not want to argue that this is the most likely case. We neverthe-
less deal with it for two reasons. First, the analysis is useful as it illustrates
that, in contrast to what one might expect, the requirements for merger re-
turns to be decreasing in own type both for the seller and the buyer are rather
strong. Second, the monotonicity properties of the pure seller-dominated
merger carry over to somewhat less extreme cases of mergers where the new
firm operates a biased mix of the technologies of its constituent parts (with
β > 0 and sufficiently small).
As for buyer-dominated mergers, the seller’s merger returns are given by
(3) and thus remain decreasing in own type. The buyer’s merger returns are
now given by
g1 (z1, z2) =
(a+ (n− 1) z2 + (n− 2))2
n2 −
(a+ nz1 − z2 + (n− 2))2
(n+ 1)2
− p.
This function is decreasing in z1, as the buyer’s stand-alone profits are in-
creasing in own type, whereas the post-merger profits are independent of
the buyer’s type by definition. That is, in this particular case, the merger
returns are in fact decreasing in own type both for the buyer and the seller,
as suggested by the lemons rationale.
For seller-dominated mergers, the set of types for which the merger is
efficient under certainty is bounded by BCD in Figure 1. Only if the seller
has a substantial efficiency advantage over the buyer, can a seller-dominated
merger be efficient. Again, it follows from Salant et al. (1983) that seller-
dominated mergers with relatively homogeneous firms are inefficient.
3.3 Case 3: Rationalization Mergers
Finally, consider the case where the new firm produces with the technology
zM = max (z1, z2) of the more efficient part (rationalization mergers). Merger
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returns for the seller are the same as above and thus given by (3). For the
buyer, merger returns are given by
g1 (z1, z2) =
(a+ (n− 1)max (z1, z2) + (n− 2))2
n2




In this case, g1 is clearly not monotone in z1: If the buyer is more efficient
than the seller (z1 ≥ z2), the rationalization merger is similar to the buyer-
dominated merger, where g1 is monotone increasing. For z1 < z2, however,
the rationalization merger is similar to the seller-dominated merger, where
g1 is monotone decreasing: A higher own type increases stand-alone profits,
but leaves post-merger profits unaffected. That is, again the buyer’s merger
return function is not monotone decreasing in own type. Furthermore, joint
merger returns can only be positive for sufficiently heterogeneous firms. How-
ever, as the buyer can now use the seller’s technology if it is more efficient,
mergers are efficient within both triangles ABE and BCD in Figure 1.
3.4 Summary
The examples discussed above serve to illustrate the point that it is anything
but clear that low types have more to gain from mergers than high types:
Even for the standard linear Cournot oligopoly model and the simplest as-
sumption on the division of post-merger profits–cash compensation for the
seller, post-merger profits of the new firm for the buyer–different types of
mergers are likely to give rise to very different merger returns functions, as
summarized in the following statement.
Observation 1 In the linear Cournot model with cash compensation for the
seller, merger returns for the seller are decreasing in own type. For the buyer,
merger returns are
(i) increasing in own type for buyer-dominated mergers;
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(ii) decreasing in own type for seller-dominated mergers;
(iii) increasing in own type if the buyer is more efficient (and decreasing
otherwise) for rationalization mergers.
Therefore, it is difficult to see how the conventional wisdom from the
standard lemons market model carries over to the analysis of mergers. To
better understand to what extent the lemons market rationale is useful for
understanding mergers under two-sided asymmetric information, we next
provide an analysis of the Bayesian equilibria of our reduced-form merger
game under various assumptions on the merger return functions. Before
doing so, we remark that Assumptions 1 to 3 hold in our linear Cournot
example with cash compensation, so results that rely on these assumptions
will be applicable.
4 Analyzing Merger Equilibria
In this section, we return to the merger game of Section 2 and characterize
its Bayesian equilibria in general terms, depending on the properties of the
merger return functions.
We use the following notation: For i = 1, 2, if firm i plays a strategy
si (zi) , we define Bi ≡ Bi (si) ≡ {zi |si (zi) = 1}, i.e., Bi denotes the set of
types zi for which firm i consents to a merger. Further, let
Gi (zi;Bj, fj) ≡
Z
Bj
gi (zi, zj) fj (zj) dzj
denote the expected merger returns for firm i with type zi when players j
are distributed as fj, and only players in Bj consent to a merger.
4.1 Two-Sided Lemons Equilibria
Though we believe the other cases are more relevant and more interesting,
we start with conditions under which low types are more likely to merge
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in equilibrium, that is, there is a cut-off equilibrium where only low types
consent to a merger. We call this a two-sided lemons equilibrium.12
We shall use the following terminology.
Definition 2 The function Gi : [zi, zi] → R satisfies strong downward
single crossing (SSC−) if, for all z0i, z00i ∈ [zi, zi] such that z0i > z00i , Gi (z0i) ≥
0 implies Gi (z00i ) ≥ 0 and Gi (z0i) > 0 implies Gi (z00i ) > 0.
This definition is closely related to the familiar single-crossing property
of incremental returns (Milgrom and Shannon 1994).13 We first give a cut-
off condition in terms of expected merger returns, and then consider more
primitive conditions on actual merger returns.14
Lemma 1 Suppose Gi (zi;Bj, fj) satisfies SSC− in zi for all Bj ⊂ Zj, i =
1, 2, j 6= i and all fj. Then every Bayesian Equilibrium (s∗1, s∗2) in pure
strategies with P [Bi (s∗i )] > 0 for i = 1, 2 satisfies the cut-off-property,
that is, there are cut-off values z∗i ∈ Zi such that
s∗i (zi) =
(
1, if zi ≤ z∗i ;
0, if zi > z∗i ;
i = 1, 2.
12Equilibria with a monotone relation between types and strategies are common in
Bayesian games: Examples include first-price auctions where the type is the bidder’s
valuation and the strategy is the bid, double auctions where the types of buyers and sellers
are valuations and costs, and the strategies are bids and asks (Chatterjee and Samuelson
1983), wars of attrition where the type is the valuation for the prize and the strategy is the
quitting period, and games of public good provision where types correspond to the costs of
providing a public good and actions correspond to the provision decision (see Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991) for a discussion of these games). Athey (2001) analyzes more generally
under which conditions such monotonicity results arise.
13Let Πi (si, zi;Bj , fj) define the expected payoff from strategy si for a firm with type
zi, facing a competitor characterized by Bj and fj . Then Πi (si, zi;Bj , fj) satisfies the
Milgrom-Shannon Single-Crossing Property in (−si, zi) if and only if Gi satisfies SSC−.
14Using the equivalence between SSC− and the Milgrom-Shannon condition, Lemma 1
is a special case of Theorem 1 in Athey (2001).
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Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for Lemma 1 is as follows: SSC− states that, for any dis-
tribution of zj, if some type zi consents to a merger, so will any lower type
z0i < zi, no matter what the distribution of zj is. The result applies this
property to the distribution of zj corresponding to the equilibrium behavior
of zj.
Lemma 1 immediately implies the following result.
Proposition 1 (two-sided lemons) If gi (zi, zj) is monotone decreasing in
zi, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, then every Bayesian Equilibrium satisfies the cut-off
property.
The intuition for this result is simple: If higher types have less to gain from
a merger for arbitrary realizations of types, then clearly they must gain less
in expectation. In the linear Cournot example, the monotonicity condition
on merger returns in Proposition 1 corresponds to a seller-dominated merger
(see section 3.2). Therefore, in this example, only low types (if any) consent
to a merger.
As we demonstrated in Borek et al. (2003), Proposition 1 generalizes to
a wide class of non-monotone functions. However, even these generalizations
do not apply for some of the merger return functions discussed in Section 3
as we now show.
4.2 Lemons and Peaches Equilibria
We next consider the case where merger returns are increasing in own type
for one firm, and decreasing in own type for the other, as suggested by the
buyer-dominated merger in linear Cournot oligopoly (see Section 3.1).
Under these circumstances, Proposition 1 has the following straightfor-
ward implication:
Corollary 1 (lemons and peaches) Suppose g1 is monotone increasing in
z1, and g2 is monotone decreasing in z2. Then, in any Bayesian Equilibrium
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in pure strategies with P [Bi (s∗i )] > 0 for i = 1, 2, there exist zH1 and zL2 such
that s1 (z1) = 1 if and only if z1 ≥ zH1 and s2 (z2) = 1 if and only if z2 ≤ zL2 .
Proof. Redefine the firms’ types as y1 = −z1 and y2 = z2 and apply
Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 reveals that the lemons rationale may be misleading in the
context of mergers: As argued in Section 3, even though a high-type firm 1
foregoes higher stand-alone profits than a low-type firm 1 when entering a
merger, its merger returns may nevertheless be higher, as it also performs
better in the merged entity. In this case, only high types of firm 1 (“peaches”)
will consent to the merger in equilibrium. For firm 2, the lemons rationale
remains correct: In equilibrium, only low types will consent to the merger. As
a result, we obtain an equilibrium where low types of firm 2 merge with high
types of firm 1. This is what we call a lemons and peaches equilibrium. As the
linear Cournot model with buyer-dominated mergers satisfies the conditions
of Corollary 1, we expect a lemons and peaches equilibrium to emerge under
these circumstances.
In the Cournot example, we further saw that merger returns may actually
be non-monotone in own type in the case of a rationalization merger: There,
returns were decreasing for z1 < z2 and increasing in z1 ≥ z2. We thus relax
the monotonicity assumption of Corollary 1, requiring only that firm 1’s
returns are increasing in own type for z1 ≥ z2, maintaining the assumption
that firm 2’s merger returns are decreasing in own type. In this setting, we
obtain the following somewhat weaker result.
Proposition 2 Suppose g1 is monotone increasing in z1 for z1 ≥ z2, and g2
is monotone decreasing in z2. Then
(i) there exists a ez2 ∈ Z2 such that s2 (z2) = 1 if and only if z2 ≤ ez2.
(ii) if, for some z1 > ez2, s1 (z1) = 1, then s1 (z01) = 1 for all z01 > ez2.
Proof. (i) Follows immediately as g2 is decreasing in z2 by assumption.
(ii) Suppose z1 > ez2. If s1 (z1) = 1, we have R ez2z g1 (z1, z2) f2 (z2) dz2 ≥
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0. Since g1 is increasing in z1 for z1 ≥ z2, and z01 > z1 > ez2, we obtainR ez2
z g1 (z
0
1, z2) f2 (z2) dz2 ≥ 0.
For instance, Proposition 2 excludes equilibria such as those sketched in
Figure 2, where bold lines correspond to sets of types consenting to a merger.





ez2 ≤ zmin1 < zmax1 < z or zmin1 ≤ ez2 < zmax1 < z.
In the case of rationalization mergers, our approach is thus limited in the
sense that we can only exclude some types of equilibria.
<Figure 2 around here>
4.3 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Mergers
Our analysis in the above section strongly restricts the possible set of equi-
libria. However, it does not exclude the existence of equilibria where mergers
do not come about in the first place. In this section, we therefore analyze
more carefully whether trade actually occurs in equilibrium.15
The first result shows that, for arbitrary distributions of types, there is
always a degenerate cut-off equilibrium where no type merges.
Proposition 3 (no-merger) Each strategy pair (s1, s2) with
P [Bi (si)] ≡
Z
Bi
fi (zi) dzi = 0, i = 1, 2,
is a Bayesian Equilibrium of the merger game.
Proof. See Appendix.
The result is very intuitive: If both firms believe that the other firm will
not consent to a merger–no matter what its type is–it is a (weakly) best
response not to consent, and beliefs are correct in equilibrium. Thus, there
15The analysis is closely related to the analysis of no trade equilibria in the standard
adverse selection literature.
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always is an equilibrium where firms merge with probability zero. Note,
however, that the no-merger equilibrium is Pareto-dominated in terms of
expected profits whenever a cut-off equilibrium exists where firms consent to
a merger with strictly positive probability.
The next proposition deals with the case that merger returns are decreas-
ing. It gives a sufficient condition under which there is no other than the
no-merger equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Suppose Zi = Zj = Z. Further assume that, for i, j =
1, 2, j 6= i, gi(zi, zj) is monotone decreasing in zi. If gi (zi, zj) ≤ 0 for i = 1, 2,
j 6= i and zi = zj, then there is no Bayesian Equilibrium where a positive
measure of firms consents to a merger.
Proof. See Appendix.
In brief, Proposition 4 states that if mergers between identical types are
not beneficial under certainty for either firm and low types have stronger
incentives to merge, then no trade is the only equilibrium.16
The result is useful in applications such as the linear Cournot model
where, for homogeneous firms, joint merger returns are negative. Then,
individual merger returns must also be negative for at least one firm for
any budget-balancing split of profits. Suppose further that the transac-
tion is share-financed rather than cash-financed as in the examples of Sec-
tion 3. Specifically, assume that firms agree to predetermined shares αi ∈
[0, 1] , α1 + α2 = 1, of the new firm’s joint profits rather than cash payment,
so that πMi (zi, zj) = αiπM(zi, zj). Clearly, if αi is sufficiently close to 1/2,
both firms must have negative merger returns if they have identical types.
Further, it is straightforward to show that if the firms’ profit shares are not
extremely asymmetric, merger returns are decreasing in own type for both
16The result generalizes to the case where Z1 6= Z2 by demanding more generally that
gi (zi, zj) ≤ 0 on the diagonal of Z rather than for zi = zj . Also, even this condition can
be generalized further. However, though the present formulation of the proposition is not
the most general, it is the easiest one to apply.
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firms. Therefore, Proposition 4 applies and there is no equilibrium where
firms merge with strictly positive probability.
So far, we have shown that, for merger returns that are decreasing in
own types, no trade is the likely outcome. We have already seen, however,
that this particular monotonicity requirement is surprisingly restrictive, even
though it can be justified, for example, for seller-dominated mergers in the
linear Cournot model. We therefore move to alternative assumptions on the
merger return functions gi, i = 1, 2. More specifically, we consider the case
where g1 is monotone increasing in z1 and g2 is monotone decreasing in z2, as
suggested by buyer-dominated mergers in the linear Cournot model, where
in equilibrium high-type buyers acquire low-type sellers.
Let
GL1 (z1, z2) ≡
Z z2
z2
g1 (z1, ez2) f2 (ez2) dez2
denote the expected returns of firm 1, anticipating that only low types of
firm 2 (below z2) will consent to a merger. Further, let
GH2 (z1, z2) ≡
Z z1
z1
g2 (ez1, z2) f1 (ez1) dez1
denote the expected returns of firm 2, anticipating that only high types of
firm 1 (above z1) will consent to the merger. Clearly, an equilibrium with
cut-off types (z∗1, z∗2) requires GL1 (z∗1 , z∗2) = 0 = GH2 (z∗1 , z∗2) . We use the
notation
G1 (z1) ≡ GL1 (z1, z2) ; G2 (z2) ≡ GH2 (z1, z2)
to describe the expected payoffs in the boundary case where player i expects
all types zj ∈ Zj, j 6= i, to consent. Then we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 Assume that g1 and g2 are continuous functions, with g1
monotone increasing in z1 and g2 monotone decreasing in z2.
(i) Suppose
G1(z1) < 0 ∨ g2(z1, z2) < 0, (4)
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or
∃z2 ∈ Z2 such that max
¡




∃z1 ∈ Z1 such that g1 (z1, z2) > 0 > GH2 (z1, z2) . (6)
Then there is no equilibrium with mergers for a positive measure of
types.
(ii) Suppose neither of conditions (4)-(6) holds. Then there is an equilib-
rium with mergers for a positive measure of types.
Proof. See Appendix.
The conditions under which the no-merger equilibrium is unique are fairly
restrictive: Condition (4) requires that merger returns are negative even in
the best possible scenario, so that a merger will never occur. Condition (5)
requires the existence of a z2 that is low enough that even the best type 1
does not want to merge if the cut-off value is zL2 = z2, but on the other hand
high enough that z2 himself does not want to merge with the best type of
z1. Finally, condition (6) requires that even the best type 1, say z01, who is
willing to merge with z2 is low enough that z2 does not want to merge if he
expects type 1 players who consent to be from [z01, z1].
Figure 3 illustrates the result. The downward sloping line GL1 (z1, z2) = 0
is the ‘zero-returns curve’ for player 1: If a player of type z1 expects types
z2 and below to consent to a merger, the expected merger returns are zero
if and only if (z1, z2) is on GL1 (z1, z2) = 0. The line is downward sloping
because g1(z1, z2) and therefore GL1 (z1, z2) are increasing in both z1 and z2,
so that a higher type of player 1 is willing to merge with lower type 2 players.
Similarly, consider GH2 (z1, z2) = 0. If a player of type z2 expects types z1
and above to consent to a merger, the expected merger returns are zero if
and only if (z1, z2) is on GH2 (z1, z2) = 0. By analogous reasoning as before,
as g2(z1, z2) and thus GH2 (z1, z2) are increasing in z1 and decreasing in z2,
GH2 (z1, z2) = 0 is upward sloping, so that a lower type of player 2 is willing
to merge with lower type 1 players.
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If condition (5) holds, GL1 (z1, z2) = 0 intersects the right boundary of the
type space above GL2 (z1, z2) = 0. Intuitively, both types of players do not
expect to gain enough from a merger. If condition (6) holds, GL1 (z1, z2) = 0
intersects the lower boundary of the type space to the left of GL2 (z1, z2) =
0. Intuitively, type 1 players are too keen on merging relative to type 2
players. Thus, if a type 1 player consents, this is not necessarily very positive
information for type 2 players: Though the type 1 players that consent to
a merger tend to be better than those that do not, they are still not good
enough on average.
<Figure around 3 here>
The next result deals with the ex-post efficiency properties of the merger.
Proposition 6 Suppose g1 is monotone increasing in z1 and g2 is monotone
decreasing in z2. Then, whenever an interior cut-off equilibrium (z∗1 , z∗2) ex-
ists, the following four cases coexist for non-degenerate sets of types.
(i) Mergers with buyer regret (BR): In particular, low-type buyers regret
merging with low-type sellers.
(ii) Mergers with seller regret (SR): In particular, high-type sellers regret
merging with low-type buyers.
(iii) Pareto-improving mergers (PIM): In particular, both high-type buy-
ers and high-type sellers benefit from the merger ex post.
(iv) Inefficient Non-Mergers (INM): In particular, some efficient merg-
ers of high-type sellers and high-type buyers do not occur.
Proof. See Appendix
The intuition of Proposition 6 is straightforward. As cut-off types break
even on average, they must regret a merger with the lowest type they expect
to consent to a merger. Using the buyer/seller terminology introduced above,
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we therefore have that a buyer of type z∗1 regrets a merger with a seller of
type z2. Similarly, a seller of type z∗2 regrets a merger with a buyer of type
z∗1 . By continuity, there are regions like BR and SR in Figure 3 where buyers
and sellers, respectively, regret the merger ex post (results (i) and (ii) in the
proposition). Similarly, because cut-off types break even on average, they
must have positive merger returns if they merge with the best type of the
other player. In particular, a merger of a buyer with type z1 and a seller of
z∗2 will benefit both firms. By continuity, there is a region like PIM where
both high-type buyers and high-type sellers benefit ex post from the merger
(result (iii) in the proposition). Finally, there is a region like INM where
mergers do not occur even though they would be ex post efficient. This is
because, in the cut-off equilibrium, some high-type sellers slightly above z∗2
do not consent to the merger for fear of selling out too cheaply.
5 The Standard Lemons Market Benchmark
Our analysis of the cut-off and no-trade equilibria in Section 4 is related to
the standard literature on one-sided asymmetric information emanating from
Akerlof (1970). This literature focuses on the circumstances under which an
object of given quality–which is only known by the seller–will be traded
at some price p, so that the seller’s post-merger profits are independent of
types. Also, stand-alone profits are independent of competitor types. Thus,
translated to our setting the following conditions hold:
Condition 1 The buyer’s distribution function F1 (z1) is degenerate.
Condition 2 Both-firms stand-alone profits, πi, are independent of zj, j 6= i.
Condition 3 The seller’s post-merger profit, πM2 , is independent of z2.
These conditions make sense when a well-known firm diversifies into some
other market by buying an unknown firm. We then interpret πM as the sum
of the buyer’s stand-alone profit and the profit he obtains in the new activity.
A cut-off result for this setting is a special case of our Proposition 1.
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Corollary 2 Suppose conditions 1-3 hold. Then every Bayesian equilibrium
satisfies the cut-off property with respect to z2.
To understand the result, note that it suffices to consider the behavior of
the seller, as the buyer’s distribution function F1 is degenerate by condition
1. Furthermore, since the seller’s post-merger profit does not depend on
own type by condition 3, his merger returns g2 = p − π2(z2) are monotone
decreasing in own type; Proposition 1 thus immediately implies the result.
The next result gives a condition for no trade in the case of one-sided
asymmetric information.
Proposition 7 Suppose conditions 1-3 hold. Further assume thatZ z2
z2
¡
πM (z1, ez2)− π1 (z1)¢ f2 (ez2) dez2 < π2 (z1, z2) for all z1, z2. (7)
Then there is no equilibrium where a positive measure of players merges.
Proof. By condition 2, πM2 must be a fixed constant p. Thus player 2
consents to a merger if and only if p ≥ π2 (z1, z2) . Now, denote the cut-off
type of player 2 as z∗2 . By (7), we haveZ z∗2
z2
¡
πM (z1, ez2)− π1 (z1)¢ f2 (ez2) dez2 < π2 (z1, z∗2) .
Thus, if p ≥ π2 (z1, z∗2), so that the cut-off type 2-player consents to merger,
the expected merger returns for player 1 are negative for every potential
cut-off type z∗2 > z2.
Condition (7) states that the buyer’s expected merger returns, gross of
the takeover price, are bounded above by the seller’s stand-alone profits. If
this condition holds, the buyer’s merger returns are not sufficiently high to
compensate the seller for foregone stand-alone profits, and the merger will
thus not occur. This outcome is clearly inefficient whenever there exist some
combinations of types for which the merger increases joint profits.
Even though conditions 1-3 are appropriate in some very specific settings,
this paper demonstrated that they are misleading for a general theory of
mergers under asymmetric information.
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6 Conclusions
Mergers under asymmetric information differ from standard lemons problems
in two ways. First, the informational asymmetry is generally two-sided.
Second, high types usually earn more both before and after the transaction.
Together, this implies that the prediction of the standard lemons model–if
any, only low type firms will be willing to merge–describes merger behavior
very inaccurately.
Using a simple linear Cournot model with cash payment, we illustrate
that the buyer’s merger returns are actually increasing (rather than decreas-
ing) in own type when the buyer has a strong impact on the technology
adopted by the merged firm. Only if the seller has a strong impact on the
merged firm’s technology will the buyer’s merger returns be decreasing in
own type. The merger pattern under two-sided asymmetric information cru-
cially depends on the properties of the buyer’s merger return function: For
mergers with sufficient seller influence on the merged firm’s technology, a
two-sided lemons cut-off equilibrium with low-type sellers and low-type buy-
ers emerges. However, for buyer-dominated mergers, a lemons and peaches
equilibrium emerges where low-type sellers merge with high-type buyers.
The standard Akerlof (1970) lemons model further overemphasizes the
no-trade problem in the context of mergers. Though it is still true that
asymmetric information may prevent some efficient mergers, there is no gen-
eral presumption that trade is inefficiently low. In fact, equilibria with trade
arise quite generally for the case that only seller returns are decreasing in
types.
Though trade is not necessarily inefficiently low in these equilibria, it does
not necessarily arise if and only if it increases joint merger returns for the
simple mechanisms we analyzed. This suggests a natural extension of the
paper: It would be interesting to find out whether there are general incentive
compatible and individually rational mechanisms with balanced budgets that
avoid ex post regret on both sides of the market. The extension is non-trivial
because it involves solving a mechanism design problem with interdependent
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valuations. However, our allocation problem has a relatively simple structure:
The only task is to induce firms to merge if and only if the merger increases
joint profits. Therefore, it does not seem hopeless to figure out mechanisms
that solve the problems discussed in this paper.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Firm i’s expected merger return, facing firm j with strategy sj, is
Gi (zi;Bj, fj) = P [Bj]Ezj
£
πMi (zi, zj) |zj ∈ Bj (sj)
¤
+




gi (zi, zj) fj (zj) dzj.
If Gi (zi;Bj, fj) is positive, firm i will consent to the merger, otherwise it will
reject the merger. By assumption, Gi (zi;Bj, fj) satisfies SSC− in zi. Thus,
if a zi ∈ Zi exists such that Gi (zi;Bj, fj) > 0, then there exists a z◦i (sj) such
that Gi (zi;Bj, fj) ≥ 0 if and only if zi ≤ z◦i (sj) . Now define
R˜i (sj) =
(
z◦i (sj) , if z◦i (sj) ≤ zi;
zi, if z◦i (sj) ≥ zi or if z◦i (sj) does not exist.
Then firm i’s optimal reaction is
Ri (zi, sj) =
(
1, if zi ≤ R˜i (sj) ;
0, if zi > R˜i (sj) .
In particular, for an equilibrium strategy sj, the best reply has the required
cut-off structure.
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose firm i plays strategy si (zi) with P [Bi (si)] = 0. Then the probability
that a merger takes place is zero and therefore firm j 6= i is indifferent
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between any strategies it can play; in particular, every strategy sj (zj) with
P [Bj (sj)] = 0 is a best response.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Assume that, for all i ∈ {1, 2}, there is no bzi such that gi (bzi, bzi) ≥ 0.
Suppose w.l.o.g. that there is a non-trivial cut-off equilibrium (z∗1 , z∗2) with
z∗1 ≥ z∗2. As g1(z∗1 , z∗1) < 0 and g1 is non-decreasing in z2, g1(z∗1 , z2) <
0 for all z2 ≤ z∗2 . Therefore, expected equilibrium profits for firm 1 areR z∗2
z2
g1 (z∗1 , z2) f2 (z2) dz2 < 0, contradicting the condition thatZ z∗2
z2
g1 (z∗1 , z2) f2 (z2) dz2 = 0
for the cut-off values (z∗1 , z∗2).
6.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. (i) Suppose (4) holds. Then the merger returns are negative even in
the best possible scenario either for firm 1 or firm 2, so that a merger will
never occur.
Suppose now that (4) does not hold, but (5) instead. If GL1 (z1, z2) < 0
or g2 (z1, z2) = GH2 (z1, z2) < 0 for all z2 ∈ Z2, then clearly there is no
equilibrium with mergers. Thus, suppose GL1 (z1, z2) > 0 for some z2 ∈ Z2
and GH2 (z1, z2) > 0 for some z2 ∈ Z2. By (5), GL1 (z1, z2) = 0 intersects
the right boundary of the type space in (z1, z02), whereas GH2 (z1, z2) = 0
intersects the right boundary in (z1, z002), with z02 > z002 (see Figure 4, Panel
(a)). Therefore, G2 (z2) = GH2 (z1, z2) < 0 for all z2 > z002 . Thus, for type
2 players to consent to a merger if zH1 = z1, we require zL2 ≤ z002 . However,
GL1 (z1, z002) < GL1 (z1, z01) = 0, so that no type 1 player will consent to a merger
if zL2 ≤ z002 . As a result, a no-merger equilibrium comes about (see case a) in
Table 1).
Now suppose (6) holds. GL1 (z1, z2) = 0 then intersects the lower boundary of
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the type space in (z01, z2), whereas GH2 (z1, z2) = 0 intersects with the lower
boundary in (z001 , z2), with z01 < z001 (see Figure 4, Panel (b)). Therefore, all
type 1 players with z1 ≥ z01 consent to a merger even with the worst type 2





< 0, ∀zH1 ≤ z01. That is, again a no-merger equilibrium comes
about (see case a) in Table 1).
<Figure 4 around here>
(ii) If none of the conditions (4)-(6) holds, we obtain one of the following
cases summarized in Table 1:
b) There is an interior intersection of GL1 (z1, z2) = 0 and GH2 (z1, z2) = 0
and therefore an interior equilibrium as in Figure 3.
c) GL1 (z1, z2) = 0 intersects the upper boundary of the type space to the




as in Figure 5, Panel (a). Then there
is an equilibrium such that type 1 players above zb1 and all type 2 players
consent.
d) GL1 (z1, z2) = 0 intersects the left boundary of the type space below
GH2 (z1, z2) = 0 as in Figure 5, Panel (b). Then there is an equilibrium
where all type 1 players and type 2 players below zs2 consent to a merger.
e) By GH2 (z1, z2) > 0, all type 2 players consent to the merger. For the
cut-off value z2 the expected merger returns are positive even for a type
1 player with the lowest possible type (GL1 (z1, z2) > 0). There is thus
an equilibrium where all types on both sides of the market consent to
the merger.
f) ByGH2 (z1, z2) > 0, all type 2 players consent to the merger. GL1 (z1, z2) =




as in Figure 5, Panel (a).
Then there is an equilibrium where all type 1 players above zb1 and all
type 2 players consent to a merger.
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g) By GL1 (z1, z2) > 0, all type 1 players consent. However, as GH2 (z1, z2) =
0 intersects the lower bound of the type space in some (z001 , z2), with
z001 > z1 (as in Figure 4, Panel (b)), ∃z1 ∈ Z1 such that g1(z1, z2) > 0 >
GH2 (z1, z2). By (6), we therefore have a no-merger equilibrium.
h) By GL1 (z1, z2) > 0, all type 1 players consent. GH2 (z1, z2) = 0 intersects
the left boundary in (z1, zs2), with zs2 > z2 (as in Figure 5, Panel (b)),
and we thus have an equilibrium where all type 1 players and all type
2 players below zs2 consent to a merger.
i) By GL1 (z1, z2) > 0 and GH2 (z1, z2) > 0, both type 1 and type 2 play-
ers face positive expected merger returns even in the worst possible
scenario, so that in equilibrium, all types on both sides of the market
consent to a merger.
Table 1: Summary of equilibria for GL1 (z1, z2) > 0 and GH2 (z1, z2) > 0
GL1 (z1, z2) < 0 GL1 (z1, z2) > 0
GH2 (z1, z2) < 0 a) no merger equilibrium g) GH2 (z1, z2) < 0:
b) interior equilibrium no merger equilibrium
c) type 1 players above zb1 and h) GH2 (z1, z2) > 0:
all type 2 players merge all type 1 players and
d) all type 1 players and type 2 players below zs2 merge
type 2 players below zs2 merge
GH2 (z1, z2) > 0 e) GL1 (z1, z2) > 0: i) all types merge
all types merge
f) GL1 (z1, z2) < 0:
type 1 players above zb1 and
all type 2 players merge
<Figure 5 around here>
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 6





< 0. Thus, by continuity, g1 (z1, z2) < 0 for (z1, z2) that are
sufficiently close to (z∗1 , z2).
(ii) is analogous: Seller regret occurs for (z1, z2) close to (z∗1 , z∗2).
(iii), (iv) Because GL1 (z∗1 , z∗2) = GH2 (z∗1 , z∗2) = 0 and both g1 and g2 are
increasing in z1, we have g1 (z1, z∗2) > 0 and g2 (z1, z∗2) > 0. By continuity,
there is thus an ε-neighborhood of (z1, z∗2) such that g1 (z1, z2) > 0 and
g2 (z1, z2) > 0 for all (z1, z2) in this neighborhood. In this neighborhood, all
the points with z2 < z∗2 satisfy (iii); the points above z∗2 satisfy (iv).
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Figure 5: Lemons and peaches equilibria where all types on one side of the
market consent
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